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LOYALTY REQUIREMENTS vs. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
L Introduction and Background
Historically, there has been a tendency on the part of Americans
to regard with fear and suspicion all things foreign. This deep-rooted
tendency, fed by the fires of two world wars, became particularly
pronounced following World War II when the so-called "Red Scare"
arose and the threat of a Communist conspiracy seemed terrifyingly
imminent to some.
Perhaps the concern over the growth and spread of subversion
was reflected most in the area of public employment where local laws
often made loyalty a pre-requisite for employment and prescribed
various tests to establish an applicant's allegiance to his country or
at least his lack of patently subversive leanings.
Following the period of agitation in the early 1950's, these local
loyalty laws came to be challenged with increasing intensity and fell
with increasing frequency. The judicial decisions in this area, did,
however, carve out a notable exception to the general rule that loyalty
oaths and similar tests would be held unconstitutional. Where a law
gave the power to a municipality, board of education or other arm
of government, as the hiring authority, to require its employees to
take loyalty oaths and sign affidavits of non-membership in subversive
organizations, it was generally upheld as constitutional.
As the Supreme Court said in Garver v. Board of Public Works
of Los Angeles:'
[A] municipal employer is not disabled because it is an agency
of the State from inquiring of its employees as to matters that
may prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for public
service. Past conduct may well relate to present fitness; past
loyalty may have a reasonable relationship to present and future
trust.2
Actually, the Garner case was simply an affirmation of a principle
announced four years earlier in United Public Workers of America v.
Mitchell,3 where the Court observed that since public employment is
a privilege rather than a right some reasonable restrictions may be
imposed on it that would otherwise be unconstitutional. "Reasonable"
is, of course, a relative term. Recognizing this both the Mitchell and
Garner cases stressed that in case of litigation over a particular re-
quirement the court must find the limitations reasonable in relation
to the end sought.4
1341 U.S. 716 (1951).
2 Id. at 720.
3 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
4See generally Note, 18 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 541 (1950); Note, 45 ILL. L,
REV. 274 (1950) ; Note, 36 MINN. L. REv. 961 (1952).
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II. Loyalty Requirements for Non-Teachers Upheld
In Gerende v. Board of Supervisors,5 the Court held constitutional
a Maryland statute which denied a place on the ballot for a Baltimore
election to one who refused to file an affidavit stating that "he is not
a person who is engaged 'in one way or another in the attempt to
overthrow the government by force or violence,' and that he is not
knowingly a member of an organization engaged in such an attempt."
This finding was prompted perhaps by the consideration that the
Attorney General of Maryland agreed to accept such an affidavit as
satisfying in full the statutory requirement. 6
The appellant in Lerner v. Casey7 had already met the necessary
hiring requirements, but was dismissed from his position as a subway
conductor in the New York City Transit System pursuant to the
Security Risk Law of the State of New York. Under this law, the
appointing authority was given power to suspend any employee if,
after investigation, it was found, upon all evidence, that reasonable
grounds existed for the belief that because of doubtful trust and
reliability the employment of such a person in a security agency would
endanger the security or defense of the nation and the state. The
required finding could be based upon the employee's past conduct,
including membership in some organization found by the state civil
service commission to be subversive. The Communist Party had been
found to be subversive. Appellant was asked under oath if he was then
a member of the Communist Party. He refused to answer, claiming
his fifth amendment privilege, and subsequently lost his job.
In upholding his dismissal, the Court did not become embroiled in
the question of fifth amendment rights, but rather based its holding
on the right of the state, as the hiring authority, to discharge employees
because of doubt as to their reliability created by refusals to answer
relevant questions put to them by their employer.
III. Loyalty Requirements for Teachers Upheld
A Philadelphia public school teacher was called before the Super-
intendent of Schools in Beilan v. Board of Education," and asked if
he had been the press director of the professional section of the Com-
munist Political Association in 1944. The teacher asked permission to
consult counsel before answering. After doing so, he steadfastly refused
to answer that question or any questions about political or religious
beliefs. A year later he was dismissed on the ground that his refusal
to answer his Superintendent's questions constituted incompetency.
In upholding this dismissal, the Court used some strong language
5 341 U.S. 56 (1951).6 Id. at 56, 57.
7357 U.S. 468 (1958).8 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
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to be applied in situations where public school teachers are involved.
It said:
By engaging in teaching in the public schools, petitioner did
not give up his right to freedom of belief, speech or association.
He did, however, undertake obligations of frankness, candor and
cooperation in answering inquiries made of him by his employ-
ing Board examining into his fitness to serve it as a public
school teacher.
We find no requirement in the Federal Constitution that a
teacher's classroom conduct be the sole basis for determining
his fitness. Fitness for teaching depends on a broad range of
factorsY
In his concurring opinions to Lerner and Beilan, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter noted that the employees involved in these two cases were not
discharged because they were labeled disloyal or because emotional and
irrational parents' groups were pointing accusing fingers and yelling
"Communist."
They were discharged because governmental authorities, like
other employers, sought to satisfy themselves of the depend-
ability of employees in relation to their duties. Accordingly, they
made inquiries that, it is not contradicted, could in and of them-
selves be made. These inquiries were balked. The services of
the employees were therefore terminated.'0
Although Beilan must be considered a leading case on the question
of loyalty and public education, its foundation was laid some six years
earlier by the cornerstone case in this area, Adler v. Board of Educ-
tion.1" This case concerned the constitutionality of the New York
Feinberg Law'12 which, together with regulations formulated by the
New York Board of Regents, required the Board of Education of
New York City to list organizations, found, after hearing, to advocate or
teach overthrow of the government by force or violence or other
unlawful means. The Feinberg Law further required that persons
teaching or advocating the overthrow of the government by any of
these means should not be appointed or retained as teachers in public
institutions. Hearings were given to teachers before any denials of
appointment or dismissals under the law, with membership in an
organization listed by the Board constituting prima facie evidence of
disqualification. It is important to note that before any organization
was put on the list compiled by the Board, it also was given a hearing
at which it could question the Board's findings and dispute their ac-
curacy and in that way seek to keep its name off the list.
9 Id. at 405, 406.
10 Id. at 410.
11342 U.S. 485 (1952).
12 See § 12-a New York Civil Service Law, and §§ 3021 and 3022, New York
Education Law (1949).
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If the plea of the group was unsuccessful at the hearing or it did
not choose to make use of the hearing and its name was placed on the
list, a teacher-member of that organization was placed in a rather
difficult position. Still teachers were given the right to a hearing to
prove either (1) that they did not know what the organization stood
for or advocated or (2) that the organization did not in fact advocate
or teach overthrow of the government by force or violence.
Before it had been on the books for even a year the Feinberg
Law's constitutionality was challenged in two actions before the New
York Supreme Court. 13 The court found the law to be unconstitutional
and restrained the Board of Regents from preparing and publishing a
list of subversive organizations. This holding was reversed by the
Appellate Division of the New York courts in L'Honsnedieux v. Board
of Regents.'4 In a strongly worded opinion, Justice Heffernan refuted
the alleged vagueness and failure of the act to establish definite stand-
ards of prescribed conduct.
The most important qualification of a teacher is loyalty to
our government. It necessarily follows that disqualification is
advocacy of the overthrow of that government. . . . To avail
oneself of the privilege of teaching certain qualifications must
be possessed, certain rights renounced. This is not an uncon-
stitutional classification.' 5
This philosophy apparently prevailed when the Feinberg Law came
before the United States Supreme Court in the Adler case.' 6 The Court
stressed that the Feinberg Law laid down reasonable terms for teachers
and that if the teachers did not choose to work on these terms they
were free to retain their beliefs and go elsewhere.
The teacher's important position in society was recognized by the
Court as it described the classroom as a "sensitive area" where the
teacher shapes the young minds of his students toward the society in
which they live so that the State has a vital interest in a teacher's work.
This means, the Court reasoned, that school authorities have the right
and the duty to screen prospective teachers as to their fitness to main-
tain the integrity of the schools.
From time immemorial, one's reputation has been determined
in part by the company he keeps. In the employment of officials
and teachers of the school system, the state may very properly
inquire into the company they keep, and we know of no rule,
constitutional or otherwise, that prevents the state, when deter-
mining the fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering
the organizations and persons with whom they associate.'-
13 Thompson v. Wallin, 196 Misc. 686, 93 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1949); L'Hommedieu
v. Board of Regents, 196 Misc. 686, 93 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1949).
14 276 App. Div. 494, 95 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1950).
15 Id. at 452 (footnotes omitted).16 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
I Id. at 493. Just prior to Adler there was a flurry of law review articles, about
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IV. Post-Adler Rumblings
The Adler, Beilen, Garner's line of cases continued to prevail past
the mid-1960's, and although there were signs that the Court's basic
policy toward loyalty requirements was undergoing a considerable
shift, whenever the state or some other governmental body was involved
as the hiring authority, the exception created by these earlier cases was
recognized and the requirements were not overturned. The general tone
of the Court's decisions in this area, however, was hostile.
In the same year that Beilan'9 was decided (1958), the Court han-
dled a loyalty case that arose in an entirely different context, Speiser v.
Randall.20 There, solely because they refused to subscribe oaths that
they did not advocate the overthrow of the Federal or State govern-
ment by force, violence or other unlawful means or advocate the
support of a foreign government against the United States in the event
of hostilities, the appellants were denied tax exemptions provided for
veterans by the California Constitution. The Court wasted little time
and minced few words in finding that the California statute which set
up these requirements denied the taxpayers freedom of speech without
the procedural safeguards required by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Still it was careful to distinguish the Garner
and Gerende cases on the ground that the principal aim of the statutes
in those cases was not to penalize political beliefs, but to deny positions
to persons supposed to be dangerous because the position might be
misused to the detriment of the public.
The appellant whose rights under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment were found to have been violated in Sweezy v.
New Hampshire2' was a teacher, but the board of education or similar
agency was not involved and there was no dismissal or refusal of
appointment. Rather, he had refused to answer some questions about
the content of some of his past lectures at the University of New
Hampshire put to him by the State Attorney General. His refusal to
answer in the face of a direction by a state court resulted in his being
adjudged guilty of contempt. 22
the Feinberg Law and most of them took the view that the Court in Adler
followed. While law review articles are notorious for their lack of agree-
ment with the prevailing judicial philosophy of the time, a random sampling
of these articles suggests that legal thinking around the time of Adler ap-
parently favored the imposition of various loyalty tests for teachers as long
as they could withstand the test of reasonableness. For a general sampling
of these articles and opinions see: Marshall, The Defense of Public Educa-
tion fromn Subversion, 51 CoLui. L. REv. 587 (1951); Dayton, The "Little
Red Schoolhouse" and the Comtmunist, 35 CORNELL L. Q. 824 (1950) ; Twohy,
The Feinberg Law, 24 ST. JoHNs L. REv. 197 (1950); Note, 18 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 541 (1950).
s 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
10 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
20 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
21354 U.S. 234 (1957).
22 The Attorney General was acting on behalf of the state legislature under a
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It would seem clear that even if the Superintendent or some other
board of education official had asked the questions as the hiring author-
ity, the Court would have held the same way on the ground that this
was not a reasonable loyalty requirement. The impingement on aca-
demic freedom implicit in allowing searching questions about the con-
tent of a teacher's lectures would doubtless have lead the Court to
the same result regardless of who had asked the questions.
An Arkansas statute in Shelton v. Tucker 3 required every teacher,
as a condition of employment in a state-supported school or college,
to file annually an affidavit listing without limitation every organization
he had belonged or regularly contributed within the preceding five
years. The contracts of the appellant teachers were not renewed when
they refused to file the required affidavits. The Court attacked the
statute's "indiscriminate sweep" and its "comprehensive interference
with associational freedom" in holding that it went far beyond what
might be justified in the exercise of the State's legitimate inquiry into
the fitness and competence of its teachers.2 4
Perhaps the strongest expression of the Court's increasingly anti-
loyalty requirements attitude came in the 1966 case of Elfbrandt v.
Russell.25 In that case, two public school teachers in Arizona, a husband
and wife, violated a state statute by refusing to take a loyalty oath
required by all state employees. The controversial statute contained
provisions subjecting to criminal penalties and discharge from employ-
ment any employee who took the oath and then knowingly and willingly
became or remained a member of the Communist Party or any other
group having for one of its purposes the violent overthrow of the
government, if the employee had knowledge of the unlawful purpose
of the organization.
In finding the statute violative of first amendment freedom of
association and guilty of unconstitutional vagueness, the Court em-
phasized that mere knowing membership is not sufficient to allow
broad resolution directing him to determine whether there were any "sub-
versive persons" in the state and recommend further legislation on this
topic. It is significant to observe that the teacher (a college professor) answer-
ed most of the questions, including whether he was a Communist, the one
most usually balked at by teachers in other cases in this area.
2 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
24 The statute in this case was, of course, far broader and considerably more
vague than the provisions of the Feinberg Law which were in question in
Adler or any of the other requirements that the Court had upheld in previous
cases involving teachers. Another feature of the case, although admittedly
in the background facts, was that it arose out of considerable racial turmoil in
and around Little Rock, and there was apparently some indication that the
listing requirements were being used to determine members of the then
despised National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(N.A.A.C.P.). This, of course, can hardly be considered a reasonable re-
quirement for teaching in any context.
25 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
[Vol. 52
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sanctions of an individual's conduct. 26 Specifically, the Court said that
a statute of this type must require a showing that an employee was
an active member with the specific intent of assisting in achieving the
unlawful ends of an organization which had as one of its purposes
the violent overthrow of the government before it will become con-
stitutionally acceptable.
Those who join an organization but do not share its unlawful
purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful activities
surely pose no threat, either as citizens or public employees.
Laws such as this which are not restricted in scope to those
who join with the 'specific intent' to further illegal action impose,
in effect, a conclusive presumption that the member shares the
unlawful aims of the organization.27
In his dissent, Mr. Justice White concluded that the majority
opinion must have been aimed at the criminal provisions of the Arizona
law which exposed a public employee to a perjury prosecution if he
swore falsely about membership when he signed the oath or if he
later became a knowing member while remaining in public employment.
He based this conclusion on the fact that the majority did not mention
or purport to overrule the "hiring authority exception" line of cases 28
nor did it expressly hold that a state must retain in its most sensitive
positions those who lend such support as knowing membership entails
to organizations whose purposes include the violent destruction of
democratic government. Though he would have upheld the state's
right to criminally punish employees violating loyalty requirements,
White argued that even if you concede that a state cannot make mere
knowing membership a crime, it need not retain the member as an
employee and it is still entitled to insist that its employees disclaim
under oath knowing membership in the prescribed groups and to con-
dition future employment upon future abstention from membership.29
Two cases involving public school teachers and loyalty requirements
set the stage for Elfbrandt and made its outcome predictable. While
2 See Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) for the proposition
that mere knowing membership without any showing of specific intent vio-
lates the first amendment.
27 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. at 17.23 Lerer v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) ; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S.
485 (1952) ; Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) ; Garner v. Board of Public Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951) ; Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) ;
and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952). In Wiemnan a loyalty oath
for teachers was struck down, not because teachers and public employees
should not be subjected to such a requirement by the state, but rather be-
cause it created a conclusive presumption of disloyalty of one who had been
a member of or affiliated with a proscribed group, regardless of whether
the employees had any knowledge of the organization's nature and purpose
at the time he was a member.
29 For elaboration on Mr. Justice White's views and reasoning, see his dissent
in Elfbrandt, 384 U.S., beginning at page 19.
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neither of the statutes involved in those cases provided any criminal
sanctions, the Court subjected their wording to close scrutiny and
analysis, concluding in both cases that the language used simply did
not meet constitutional standards.
A Florida statute in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction30 re-
quired every state employee to swear in writing that he had never
lent his "aid, support, advice, counsel, or influence to the Communist
Party." The penalty for failing or refusing to sign this oath was im-
mediate discharge. The Court held that the quoted words were so
vague and uncertain that no one could be sure of their meaning. "What
do these phrases mean? . .. [C]ould anyone honestly subscribe to the
oath who had ever supported any cause with contemporaneous knowl-
edge that the Communist Party also supported it ?-31
A similar action was brought in Baggett v. Bullitt3 2 by faculty
members, staff, and members of the student body of the University
of Washington who sought a judgment declaring unconstitutional two
Washington statutes requiring the execution of two different oaths by
state employees. One of the statutes was passed in 1931 and applied
only to teachers, who, upon applying for a license to teach or renewing
an existing contract, were required to subscribe to this oath:
I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the consti-
tution and laws of the United States of America and of the State
of Washington, and will by precept and example promote re-
spect for the flag and the institutions of the United States of
America and the State of Washington, reverence for law and
order and individual allegiance to the government of the United
StatesY3
The oath requirements of the 1955 Act, 34 which applied to all state
employees, not just teachers, incorporated various provisions of the
Washington Subversive Activities Act of 1951, which provided gen-
erally that no subversive person would be eligible for employment in,
or appointment to any office, or any position of trust or profit in the
government, or in the administration of the business of the state or
any of its political subdivisions.35 Among other things, the teachers
30 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
31 Id. at 286.
32377 U.S. 360 (1964).
33 WASH. REV. CODE § 28.70.150 (Supp. 1966).
34 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.81.070 (Supp. 1966).
35 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.81.010(5) (1951) defines a subversive person as "any
person who commits, attempts to commit, or aids in the commission, or advo-
cates, abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit, attempt
to commit, or aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy
or alter, or to assist in the overthrow, destruction or alteration of, the con-
stitutional form of the government of the United States, or of the state of
Washington, or any political subdivision of either of them by revolution,
force or violence; or who with knowledge that the organization is an organi-
zation as described in subsections (2) and (3) hereof [which subsections
define what is meant by "subversive organization" and "foreign subversive
[Vol. 52
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asked to swear that they were not members of the Communist Party
or knowingly of any other subversive organization. The statements
they made under oath were made subject to the penalties of perjury.
Significantly, Mr. Justice White, who dissented so vigorously in
Elfbrandt, wrote the majority opinion holding that these oath require-
ments and the statutory provisions on which they were based were
invalid on their face because their language was unduly vague, un-
certain and broad.
As in Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, . . . we are
dealing with indefinite statutes whose terms, even narrowly
construed, abut upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment
freedoms .... Those with a conscientious regard for what they
solemnly swear or affirm, senstive to the perils posed by the
oath's indefinite language, avoid the risk of loss of employment,
and perhaps profession, only by restricting their conduct to
that which is unquestionably safe. Free speech may not be so
inhibited 6
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Clark contended that the oath required in
Cramp37 was of much broader scope than the one in Baggett and it
was replete with defects not present in the Washington oath. Further-
more, Clark pointed out that the oath that was upheld in Gerende3s
was written in language identical to the 1955 Washington oath. Wash-
ington had copied the wording of the Maryland statute primarily be-
cause of the Court's approval of it.
V. Adler Revirited-And Overruled
With this background of a change in attitude toward loyalty re-
quirements on the part of the Court, a number of faculty members
of the State University of New York challenged the Feinberg Law,
which the Court had upheld as constitutional 15 years before in the
Adler case.39 Specifically, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against a New York plan, formulated partly in the terms of the Fein-
berg Law and partly in administrative regulations, which the state used
to prevent the appointment or retention of subversives in State em-
ployment.
Not surprisingly, the Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,40
held that the Feinberg Law was unconstitutional insofar as it sanc-
tioned mere knowing membership without any showing of specific
intent to further the unlawful aims of the Communist Party of the
United States or of the State of New York. As a result, Adler was
organization" and declare the Communist Party to be a subversive organiza-
tion and membership therein a subversive activity], becomes or remains a
member of a subversive organization." [emphasis added]
36 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
37 Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
38 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
39 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
40 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
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summarily and unceremoniously overruled after prevailing as the law
in this area for some 15 years and the "hiring authority exception,"
created by such cases as Lerner, Adler, Beilan, Gerende, Garner,
Nelson and Wiemnan,41 is, at the very least, seriously shaken, if not
totally destroyed. The Court made an attempt to distinguish Adler on
the ground that the contention of vagueness urged in Keyishian was
not heard or considered in Adler. A reading of Adler and the applicable
sections of the Feinberg Law42 leave some doubt as to the validity of
this reasoning,43 but regardless of whether Adler has been specifically
overruled in law, it unquestionably has been overruled in spirit.
In attempting to justify the decision it ultimately reached, the
Court in Keyishian made the bald assertion that subsequent constitu-
tional doctrines had rejected the premises upon which Adler had sus-
tained the provision of the Feinberg Law constituting membership in
an organization advocating forceful overthrow of government a ground
for disqualification from employment. Significantly, the cases cited in
support of this proposition do not in any respect reject the holdings of
Adler and some of them are so far off point as to make their presence
meaningless.
The Court spent much time and consumed considerable space in
an effort to show that the plan to test loyalty adopted by the State of
New York was deficient because of its vagueness. This said the Court
was "aggravated by prolixity and profusion of statutes, regulations,
and administrative machinery, and by manifold cross-references to
interrelated enactments and rules. ' 44 Four dissenters were not convinced
by this charge of vagueness and the Court's arguments in support of
this charge. As Mr. Justice Clark said: "The blunderbuss fashion in
which the majority couches 'its artillery of words,' together with the
morass of cases it cites as authority and the obscurity of their applica-
tion to the question at hand makes it difficult to grasp the true thrust
of its decision." 45
But, leaving the vagueness issue aside, the truly disturbing aspect
of the decision is the basic policy of the Court which makes it all but
impossible for the State to keep a teacher who is a knowing member of
the Communist Party out of the classroom. This appears to be the only
sound conclusion from the statement of the Court that "mere knowing
41 Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) ; Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S.
485 (1952); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Gerende v.
Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) ; Garner v. Board of Public Works,
341 U.S. 716 (1951); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960);
and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
42 Section 3021, New York Education Law (1949) and § 105, New York Civil
Service Law (1951).
43 See Mr. Justice Clark's forceful and stinging dissent in Keyishian for elabora-
tion on this point.
44 385 U.S. at 604.
45 Id. at 620-621.
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membership without a specific intent to further the unlawful aims of
an organization is not a constitutionally adequate basis for exclusion
from such positions as those held by appellants." 46
It appears that other cases47 require active participation in the
affairs of the Party or active advocacy of overthrow of the govern-
ment by force, violence or other unlawful means as a basis for finding
the necessary specific intent. This, as will be shown hereafter, seems
unrealistic as a practical matter and not be to required by constitutional
doctrine. Academic freedom simply should not be discussed as though
it existed in a vacuum without any thought given to the rights of the
individuals in society. In support of what it describes as "the stifling
effect on the academic mind from curtailing freedom of association"4
by barring employment as teachers to those who are members of listed
organizations, the Court cites a study appearing in the Yale Law
Journal in 1952." Both the amount of time that has elapsed since this
study and the fact that it was made at a time when there was con-
siderable turmoil produced by Senate investigations of Communist
infiltration made it of dubious value today.
The impression is unavoidable that the Court had at last decided
to abolish the "hiring authority" exception in this area and hold loyalty
requirements as a prerequisite for public employment and teaching
invalid. Whatever might be said for the Court's wisdom in holding the
loyalty requirements of the New York law unconstitutional, it can at
least be asserted that in Keyishian it chose a poor vehicle to achieve
its purpose. As Mr. Justice Clark stated in his forceful dissent "No
Court has ever reached out so far to destroy so much with so little."50
VI. Academic Freedom
It is necessary to consider one further attack on loyalty oaths and
programs as they touch the teaching profession. The allegation is com-
monly made that such programs violate academic freedom. It seems
worthwhile then to consider some of the basic policies which collide
head on when the interests of academic freedom are weighed against
the State's right to protect its school system from the threat of sub-
versive influences.
In this sensitive area the Court traditionally has applied a kind of
balancing test (whether implicitly or explicitly) under which the rights
46 Id. at 606.
47 Notably Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) and Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
48 385 U.S. at 607.
40 Jahoda & Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Thought: An Explora-
tory Study of the Impact of the Loyalty and Security Programs, 61 YALeP L. J.
295 (1952). The Court describes this as a "recent" study. If Adler has be-
come antiquated in 15 years, it would seem that the reliability and pertinence
of a study in this area made 15 years ago would at least be subject to some
legitimate doubt.50 385 U.S. 622.
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of the individual are weighed against the rights and interests of society
as a whole. But the Court in Keyishian refuses to apply this test and,
in keeping with contemporary decisions in areas other than teaching, 51
considers only the rights of individuals (in this case, college professors)
with no apparent reference to the rights of a society vitally affected by
the quality of its schools.
It is, of course, obvious that loyalty cannot be the sole criterion of
competence, particularly in the area of education. The proposition that
a good, loyal teacher is a fortiori a competent teacher is patently false.
Just as false and misleading, however, is the assertion that a Communist
teacher is good for students since he can acquaint them with the "other
side" of the picture and thereby give their education a pleasing balance,
enabling them to place the material they have learned about the Amer-
ican system in proper perspective. On purely practical grounds it can
be established that a Communist would not make a good teacher. If
it is valid to say that a competent teacher presents both sides of a given
subject then a Communist necessarily would be incompetent since he
is trained to present a one-sided, albeit subtly slanted, view of history
and government.
At the root of much of the controversy over loyalty requirements
is the mistaken idea that they simply cannot co-exist with academic
freedom. It is important to remember that on the Constitutional scale,
Mr. Justice Douglas notwithstanding, academic freedom is not an abso-
lute right, although it does merit the status of a constitutionally pro-
tected right. As such, it surely does not enjoy any more protection than
freedom of speech and assembly. The majority of the Court frequently
has recognized that such first amendment rights are sometimes out-
balanced by considerations of public necessity.52
If academic freedom is not absolute then it follows that limitations
may be placed on it based on the state's right of self-preservation. It
cannot realistically be said that academic freedom is invaded when an
educational system requires that its teachers: (1) refrain from knowing
membership in the Communist Party or any organization that ad-
vocates the overthrow of the government by force or violence, and
(2) take a loyalty oath to the effect that they have compiled with this
very minimal requirement.
VI. Teachers and Oaths
Perhaps the most basic problem is that many teachers apparently
feel insulted at being asked to take an oath and respond with an
51 Especially in the field of criminal law with such controversial cases as Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 375 U.S. 902 (1963) and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966).
52 See, for example, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) ; Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) ; American Communications Association,
C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) and Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
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indignant refusal that they feel is justified on moral and constitutional
grounds. This attitude seems far more prevalent among college pro-
fessors as is evidenced by the significant number of important cases
in this area which involve a group of college faculty members testing
the constitutionality of an oath or other loyalty requirement. This re-
calcitrant, almost defiant, attitude is in marked contrast to other pro-
fessions where taking an oath is considered an honor rather than an
attack on honor. Lawyers, doctors and judges all must take oaths and
do so with a pride in the solemnity and dignity this practice adds to
their profession. Supreme Court justices themselves must also take
oaths before being admitted to office.53 But under present standards it
is questionable whether even these seemingly innocuous judicial oaths
could withstand the discriminating scrutiny given other oaths which
have had the misfortune of coming before these same men on appeal.
As a direct result of the decisions holding oaths and various other
loyalty requirements unconstitutional it seems likely that an increasing
number of teachers will feel insulted at being asked to take an oath
without really knowing why. Consequently, more oaths will be chal-
lenged until the point is reached where all oaths will be held uncon-
stitutional as applied to teachers.
Those who oppose loyalty oaths often argue that they are really
silly and ineffective because if a person is in truth an avowed Com-
munist he would have no hesitancy in lying under oath if this would
help him achieve his purpose of getting into the school system. But the
Court has often stated that it would not employ its own wisdom to
decide an argument of this nature. That a law and its requirements
are deemed silly or ridiculous should not be a sufficient reason for
ruling it unconstitutional. As Mr. Justice Stewart said in his dissent
Mr. Justice Marshall took two oaths before being installed as an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court on October 2, 1967. The language
of these oaths could conceivably be condemned as vague and indefinite and
the same far-fetched hypotheticals that the Court often gives in its opinions
could easily be raised. For example, could any Justice honestly swear that he
will "well . . . discharge the duties of the office I am about to enter" when
by the test of time and contemporary criticism he might be considered as
having done a poor job? Such questions can always be raised.
The two oaths here quoted can be found at 88 Sup. Ct. XIX and the
second oath is prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1964).
I, Thurgood Marshall, do solemnly swear that I will support and
defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, for-
eign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the
same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.
I, Thurgood Marshall, do solemnly swear that I will administerjustice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to
the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and per-
form all duties incumbent upon me as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States according to the best of my abilities and
understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United
States. So help me God.
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in Griswold v. Connecticut: "I think this is an uncommonly silly law.
• . . But we are not asked . . . to say whether we think this law is
unwise, or even asinine. We are asked to hold that it violates the
United States Constitution. And that I cannot do."54
The oath, it would seem, cannot be found to be utterly futile. Fear
is one of the most effective preventive devices and while fear of mere
dismissal from a position in the school system may not serve as much
of a deterrent, fear of a criminal sentence for perjury would at least
prompt potential violators to think twice before applying for a job in
a school system.
The recent decisions of the Court 5 have established that mere
knowing membership in the Communist Party or a similar organization
that advocates the overthrow of the government by force or violence
is not sufficient to justify a teacher's rejection for employment or his
dismissal from a present teaching position. The Court now requires
that both knowledge and specific intent to further the group's unlawful
aims5 be proven. In taking this approach, the Court seems to have
remembered the caution of Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion
Adler that innocence under a "knowing membership" statute turns on
knowledge "and when the witch hunt is on, one who must rely on
ignorance leans on a feeble reed." 57 Without doubt it can be admitted
that this observation by Mr. Justice Douglas is not without perception.
However, the mere fact that the burden of proving lack of knowledge
may be cast upon an individual teacher seems an insufficient reason for
permitting a Communist to teach in the classroom as long as he does
not reveal that he is an active member or actively striving to attain
the goals of the Party.
Furthermore, such an approach overlooks the basic proposition that
the State has a right to conclude that the generality of experience dic-
tates that the vast majority of those who belong to he Communist Party
do believe in its goals and that, therefore the State simply does not
have to take a chance by retaining them as employees. This reasoning
appears particularly pertinent when applied to the field of teaching. It
should not be overlooked that a teacher who believes in Communism
can subtly and insidiously prepare young minds so that in the future
they will be ready, when the call is sounded, to follow the Communist
banner into action aimed at overthrow of the Government by force.
In light of these considerations, it does not seem unreasonable for
the State to take the position that anyone who is a knowing member of
the Communist Party should not be permitted to teach in the public
schools. If a State determines that it wishes to use an oath or a similar
54381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965).
55 Notably, Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) and Elfbrandt
v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
56 See note 46, supra.
5 342 U.S. at 509.
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technique in an effort to get a statement from a teacher or prospective
teacher as to his present membership in the Communist Party it is
hard to understand why it should be rebuffed because some few people
might take the oath and later be asked to prove that they were not in
fact knowing members of the Party.
In spite of Mr. justice Douglas' warning about the onslaught of
witch hunts, it is submitted that, statistically, the existence of such an
occurrence is rare. In the vast majority of circumstances the burden
of proof would not be any greater than it was for the applicant for
admission to the bar of the State of New Mexico when the bar
examiners were concerned about his good character. In that case5 the
Court had no difficulty in evaluating his explanations for the state of
the record made against him and in finally concluding that he had met
the burden of proof and was entitled to admission to the Bar of New
Mexico.
It would seem that in the last analysis it would take tactics on the
part of the press, radio and television to create any kind of realistic
conditions that would justify being described as a witch hunt. If those
conditions were to exist there seems to be no reason why the Supreme
Court could not fashion a corrective as it does when undue publicity
make a fair trial impossible.5 9
Assuming that the Court would occasionally find that circumstances
were such that it would be unfair to expect the accused to bear the
burden of proving lack of knowledge and the Court felt that it had no
alternative but to put the teacher back in the classroom, the isolated
effect would not present as much potential danger to the State as would
exist if there were no loyalty requirements at all. The current Court
policy can only serve to hinder the State in its efforts to keep out of
teaching positions those whom the State can legitimately suspect on the
ground that as knowingly members of the Communist Party they gen-
erally will take the opportunity to influence and mold the impression-
able minds of the young.60
5s Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
59 See in this connection Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) in which the
Court set aside the conviction of Dr. Sam Sheppard following the celebrated
Sheppard Murder Trial.
GO As the court said in Pawell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
146 Pa. Super. 147, 22 A.2d 43, 46 (1941): [T]o say that the State must
supinely await an overt subversive act before it may discharge a Communist
from its employ is to admit that it has none of the attributes of sovereignity."
See also. Steiner v. Darby, 88 Cal. App. 2d 481, 199 P.2d 429 (1948). The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to this case in Parker v.
County of Los Angeles, 337 U.S. 929 (1949), but dismissed the writs of
certiorari in 338 U.S. 327 (1949) because it appeared, after the case came to
argument, that the constitutional issues sought to be raised were not ripe for
decision; Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 71 A.2d 474 (1950), in which
the court said that the citizens and taxpayers of the State, through their
representatives, are entitled to decide who shall work for them and who shall
teach in those schools and colleges which are State institutions supported by
State funds.
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In writing the Keyishian decision, Mr. Justice Brennan apparently
overlooked the important distinction he made in Speiser v. Randall"
regarding interests that were "clearly within the sphere of government
concern." Brennan in that case felt that it was constitutionally permis-
sible to deny positions to persons supposedly dangerous because the
position might be misused to the detriment of the public.62 It appears
then that Mr. Justice Brennan's own words could be turned against
his reasoning in Keyishian to support the contention that there should
be some kind of loyalty requirements that teachers in public education
must meet in order to qualify for a teaching position.
In his stinging dissent in Keyishian, Mr. Justice Clark emphasized
the importance of the school system and would agree with Mr. Justice
Brennan's earlier opinion that teaching is a position that should be
carefully regulated to avoid possible abuses that would seriously affect
the public welfare. Specifically, Clark stated: "Our public educational
system is the genius of our democracy. The minds of our youth are
developed there and the character of that development will determine
the 'future of our land. Indeed, our very existence depends upon it. ' 63
There are those who scoff at the suggestion that even an avowed
Communist actually intends to pervert the minds of the young and use
the classroom as a launching pad for his segment of the much-discussed
world takeover. To dispel any lingering doubt that a Communist-
inspired teacher could, in the words of Mr. Justice Brennan, misuse
the position "to the detriment of the public," the following quotation
from the May, 1937 issue of The Communist should be instructive:
Communist teachers are, therefore faced with a tremendous
social responsibility. They must consider not only their own
teacher problems, but the problems of the children. They must
fight for the latter. They must mobilize the other teachers in
the fight. They must take advantage of their positions, without
exposing themselves .... 64 [emphasis added]
The further argument is often made that even though a teacher
may be a dedicated Communist there is no reason to believe that he
will exert any detrimental influence upon his children. The implausi-
bility of this position was perhaps best pointed out by the New York
61357 U.S. 513 (1958).
62 Id. at 527.
63 385 U.S. at 628.
64Frank, The Schools and the People's Front, THE COMMUNIST, May, 1937 at
438. This article, of course, is by almost any standards extremely dated. How-
ever, its age does not necessarily destroy its validity or relevance. While it is
undoubtedly true that the Communist Party in America has undergone some
significant changes and upheavals in the last 30 years, there is no reason to
believe that its basic tenets have changed notably. Rather the approach and
procedure have been updated and polished to become more palatable to the
"enlightened" generation, but the underlying principles are presumably still
very much intact and the schools continue to be an area ripe for intensive
concentration.
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Appellate Court in L'Honmedieux v. Board of Regents,65 one of the
state cases preceding the decision on the Feinberg Law by the Court
in Adler. In dealing with this contention the court stated:
We are not so naive as to accept as accept as gospel the argu-
ment that a teacher who believes in the destruction of our form
of government will not affect his students. It is not necessary
to impart a thought by direct statement. The result may be
accomplished by indirec, subtle insinuations; by what is left
unsaid as well as by what is said. 6
VIII. Conclusions
Before Keyishian the Court began to indicate a hostility to loyalty
oaths and other loyalty qualifications for teaching and similar areas of
sensitive public service. With this as a background, the Keyishian
decision carried the Court's new policy to its logical conclusion. It
seems unlikely under present standards that any loyalty oath will be
drafted sufficiently well to meet the stringent criteria apparently applied
by the Court in these situations.
As if to reinforce this observation, the Court in November, 1967,
struck down a Maryland loyalty oath as being unconstitutionally vague
in Whitehill v. Elkins.67 In doing so it attempted to distinguish the
Gerende case on the ground that the Court there did not pass upon or
approve the statutory definition of a "subversive" person. The oath
involved in Whitehill 68 was notable for its lack of incendiary or am-
biguous terms and represented the culmination of what Mr. Justice
Harlan, in his dissent, described as Maryland's "meticulous efforts"
to conform it to the requirements of Gerende. It did not even include
the limited sort of "membership" clause which the Court had also
approved in Gerende.
Perhaps realizing the futility of trying to attack the language of the
oath itself, the Court insisted that the oath was not to be read in
isolation, but in connection with sections 1 and 13 of a Maryland law
known as the Ober Act,69 which defined "subversive" and other similar
terms in a way that the Court found unacceptable under current con-
stitutional standards.
In finding that the oath was not to be read in isolation, the Court
was able to fall back on the now familiar refrain that it was invalid
05 276 App. Div. 494, 95 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1950).
66 Id. at 453.
67 389 U.S. 54 (1967).6 8 The actual wording of the oath was:
I, , do hereby certify that I am not engaged
in one way or another in the attempt to overthrow the Government of
the United States, or the State of Maryland, or any political subdivision
of either of them, by force or violence.
I further certify that I understand the aforegoing is made subject
to the penalties of perjury prescribed in Article 27, Section 439 of the
Annotated Code of Maryland (1957 edition).
69 MD. ANN. CODE, art. 85A (1957).
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because of vagueness. This finding was made even under the assump-
tion that the State Attorney General and the Board of Regents were
authorized so to construe the Ober Act as prescribing a narrow oath
that excluded alteration of government by peaceful revolution and
excluded all specific reference to membership in subversive groups. Just
as they did in Keyishian, the dissenters again responded to the charge
of vagueness by questioning its validity and criticizing the majority's
reasoning. Writing for the three dissenters, 70 Mr. Justice Harlan said:
The Court concludes, however, that the oath must be read
'in connection with' certain sections of the Ober Law because,
as a state matter, the authority of the Board of Regents to
require an oath derives from that law. The Court does not pause
to tell us what the 'connection' is or to explain how it serves to
invalidate the unambiguous oath required of this appellant....
The oath does not refer to the statute or otherwise incorporate
it by reference. It contains no terms that are further defined in
the statute. In short, the oath must be judged on its own bottom.7 1
After the Whitehill decision it seemed difficult, if not wholly im-
possible, under the stringent standards set by the Court, to conceive
of any loyalty oath or even a simple affirmation of allegiance to one's
country that would be acceptable. But, as if to clarify its position and
underscore the hazards of predicting its mood and philosophy, the
Court in a per curiam decision in Knight v. Board of Regents72 (Jan-
uary 22, 1968) affirmed a decision of the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of New York which upheld the constitutionality
of a New York law requiring teachers to sign an affirmative oath as a
prerequisite of employment in any public school or any private school
whose property was wholly or partly tax exempt.7 3
In the Knight case,7 4 twenty-seven faculty members at Adelphi
University, a private, non-profit institution of higher learning in Garden
City, New York, brought an action to enjoin the enforcement of an
oath provision that they were required by state law to sign.
"OThe number of dissenters has been reduced by one since the departure of
Mr. Justice Clark from the Court last summer. Mr. Justice Marshall sided
with the majority so that only justices Harlan, Stewart and White remain as
opposed to the full-scale condemnation of loyalty requirements for teachers
in the state public education system.
71389 U.S. at 63 (1967).
72390 U.S. 36 (1968).
7' Section 3002, New York Education Law (1934) requires every citizen teacher,
instructor or professor in any public school or in any private school with
property wholly or partly tax exempt to execute an oath which reads as
follows:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution
of the United States of America and the Constitution of the State of
New York, and that I will faithfully discharge, according to the best
of my ability, the duties of the position of ..........................(title of position and name or designation of school, college, university
or institution to be here inserted) to which I am now assigned.
74269 F. Supp. 339 (1967).
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The teachers relied heavily on West Virginia State Board of Edu-
cation v. Barnette75 in which the Court held unconstitutional a state
statute requiring school children to salute and pledge allegiance to the
American flag. In answering the plaintiffs' arguments, the federal court
said that the pledge of allegiance involved in Barnette was far more
elaborate than the affirmation required of the New York teachers. The
Court further distinguished Barnette on the ground that the plaintiffs
in that case were members of a religious group who claimed that the
requirement of the oath and accompanying salute violated their reli-
gious beliefs while the teachers in this case made no claim based on
religious freedom. As might be expected, the main thrust of the
teachers' attack against § 3002 was that it was vague and indefinite
and they supported this contention by citing the line of Supreme Court
cases which struck down "negative loyalty oaths. '76
The Court distinguished these negative oaths on the ground that
they required the affiant to state that he was not and never had been
a member of certain organizations while the oath in question required
no more than a simple affirmation that the subscriber would support
the federal and state constitutions and that he would be a dedicated
teacher. In fact, the Court equated the statutory language used in the
required oath to "that allegiance which, by the common law, every
citizen was understood to owe his sovereign." 77
In conceding that it was constitutionally permissible to demand an
oath or affirmation, like the one they refused to take, from state and
federal public officials, the teachers contended that their speech must
be totally free of interference. The Court said that it interpreted the
statute and oath as imposing no restrictions upon political or philo-
sophical expressions by teachers.
A state does not interfere with its teachers by requiring them
to support the governmental systems which shelter and nourish
the institutions in which they reach, nor does it restrict its
teachers by encouraging them to uphold the highest standards of
their chosen profession. Indeed, it is plain that a state has a
clear interest in assuring'. . . careful and discriminating selection
of teachers' by its publicly supported educational institutions.78
Since the Court affirmed this decision per curiam without opinion
it is difficult to estimate its full significance. If, however, it means that
the Court is now making a distinction between negative and positive
loyalty oaths it will supply something of a concrete guideline for legis-
lators and public boards of education to follow. It is submitted, how-
75- 319 U.S. 624 (1934).7GSee, for example, Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) ; Cramp v. Board of
Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) ; Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11(1966) ; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (all of which
have been discussed previously in this article).
77269 F. Supp. at 341.
781d. at 341-42.
19681
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ever, that if this is the distinction the Court is now disposed to make
it is at best artificial. There seems to be little difference, except perhaps
in literary style, between an oath that the subscriber will support the
state and federal Constitutions and one in which he simply swears that
he is not a knowing member of a group which advocates the overthrow
of the government by force or violence, in that it would be inconsistent
for an avowed Communist to refuse to swear to the one and not the
other.
It is true, of course, that a person could be a knowing member of
a subversive organization and vehemently disagree with its ends and
purposes. One might join purely out of curiosity or because of a desire
to learn more about the group so as to oppose more effectively the
achievement of its objectives. In these instances it seems clear that
the distinction between these two kinds of oaths would be justified, but
it must be admitted that the instances of such curiosity seekers and
Herbert Philbrick-type "infiltrators" is on the broad scale of experience
the exception rather than the rule. In any case it does not seem to be
the proper basis for an all-embracing distinction among the various
kinds of loyalty oaths in the public education field.
To avoid the confusion and uncertainty of interpretation of the
Court's position on loyalty oaths, which must result inevitably from -the
Keyishian and Knight cases, the Court could clarify the entire area
by offering a more workable formula. If this concept of a "positive"
oath is to be the standard then the Court should attempt to make this
crystal clear in an opinion notably free of ambiguity and judicial
hedging.
This use of a "positive" oath, however, seems to be a much too
simple answer to a complicated and vexing problem. If the Court
were to make this the standard it probably would have to overrule at
least portions of prior cases that held positive-worded oaths uncon-
stitutional. For example, a Washington statute9 which the Court ruled
unconstitutional in Baggett v. Bullitt0 used words in its opening phrase
identical to those in the New York statute upheld in Knight. In both of
them the oath is positive throughout.
The most dramatic contribution the Court could make in the im-
portant but puzzling area of academic freedom and loyalty oaths would
seem to be the definition of what it considers an acceptable oath and
the establishment of some type of workable standard for public em-
ployers to follow in their efforts to preserve public education from the
taint of subversion. Perhaps the Court has made its first step in this
direction by its per curiam upholding of the Knight oath, but if legis-
lators and public employers are not to proceed on pure speculation the
Court must undertake to set the matter to rest in a detailed opinion.
79 Wash. Laws 1931, Ch. 103. FRANK J. DAILY
so 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
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